Constructive Interpretation of Statute Law and the Supreme Court

Abstract

The article analyzes the constructive interpretation of statute law within the context of the American legal tradition, with the aim of demonstrating that judicial application of statutory law is not exhausted by a literal reading of the normative text, but rather requires a systematic and teleological activity directed toward fulfilling its purposes and preserving its rationality. It adopts a legal-doctrinal and comparative methodology based on the examination of authors in legal hermeneutics and legal methodology, categories of common law, and precedents of the Supreme Court of the United States, especially in criminal and constitutional matters. It argues that legal construction goes beyond strict textual interpretation, allowing the judge to reconstruct normative meaning through consideration of the legal system, the purpose of the statute, legislative intent, and traditional interpretive maxims such as ejusdem generis, particularly in situations of ambiguity, vagueness, or constitutional conflict. The article further shows that the Supreme Court uses constructive interpretation both to narrow the scope of vague statutes and preserve their constitutionality and to adjust statutory application to the spirit of the legal order, notably in issues such as double jeopardy, criminal limitation periods, and the definition of offenses under common law. It concludes that constructive interpretation is an essential instrument for rationalizing and adapting statutory law to concrete reality, enabling compatibility among text, normative purpose, and constitutional review in judicial activity.