The Public Prosecution Service in the Constitution: A Proposed Constitutional Framework

Abstract

The article analyzes the constitutional position of the Public Prosecution Service, with the aim of proposing an institutional framework capable of overcoming its historical indeterminacy among the branches of government and recognizing its nature as an autonomous and independent branch of the Judiciary. It adopts a legal-doctrinal and constitutional methodology based on the critical examination of the theory of separation of powers, state sovereignty, the legislation then in force, especially Complementary Law No. 40, and doctrinal constructions concerning the Public Prosecution Service as an organ of the State, a political agent, and a possible fourth power. It argues that the Public Prosecution Service is neither to be confused with the Executive Branch nor to be understood as a separate autonomous power, because its activity is essential to the judicial function and, together with the Judiciary, forms the complex jurisdictional act, while preserving its functional independence. The article shows that linking the Public Prosecution Service to the Executive would undermine judicial autonomy and that conceiving it as a fourth power lacks sound technical foundation, which is why it proposes its constitutional placement within the chapter on the Judiciary, with its own legal framework, administrative and financial autonomy, elected leadership, defined institutional powers, and guarantees equivalent to those of the Judiciary. It concludes that the constitutional strengthening of the Public Prosecution Service depends on its express definition as a permanent national institution essential to the judicial function of the State, organized in an autonomous structure within the Judiciary and entrusted with the defense of the legal order, the Constitution, and the unavailable interests of society.